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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the social value of signaling by recasting the Spences
(1973) signaling model in a causal relationship: human capital investment is neces-
sary to reduce the marginal cost of signaling. Our model contains distinct features:
(i) the choice of signaling a¤ects the level of human capital investment and (ii) the
proportion of high and low type in the entire workers is endogenously determined.
From the perspective of welfare, we compare two contrasting forms of signaling,
separating and pooling, and nd that the choice of a proper form of signaling is de-
pendent on how each signaling induces the human capital investment. We identify
circumstances where it is socially benecial to stay with a separating signaling and
focus on promoting the human capital investment, and where it is socially bene-
cial to switch from a separating signaling to a pooling signaling and moderate the
investment level.
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1 Introduction
Since the birth of the signaling model by Spence (1973), the role of education has been
extensively tested to identify whether its signaling e¤ect exists and is greater than the
other competing e¤ect, human capital augmenting (see Wolpin (1977), Riley (1979), Lang
and Kropp (1986), Tyler, Murnane and Willett (2000), Bedard (2001), and section 5.1 in
Riley (2001) among others).1 Importantly, the existing literature has paid attention to
the two separate aspects of education: education level measured by a length of schooling
acts to signal individual ability to rms in one aspect, while it enhances the productivity
valued by rms in the other aspect. Despite such extensive studies, theoretical papers
have rarely considered a potential relationship between the two aspects.
This paper proceeds from the following long-standing questions in economics. What
is the social value of signaling? Is signaling socially benecial or wasteful? It is well-
known that it may be socially harmful to convey private information in the form of
costly signaling. In this sense, it is rather unsurprising that standard signaling models
often contradict the social value of signaling: the signaling aspect of education is socially
wasteful though it may well increase private earnings. At the same time, however, it
is quite surprising that theoretical models commonly ignore the potential contribution
of signaling to the other aspect of education, human capital investment: the signaling
aspect of education may promote the human capital investment by delivering the benet
of the investment. The social value of signaling may be unduly underrated if its e¤ect
on the human capital investment is not taken into account. This possibility thus raises
important questions. What is a proper form or a proper level of signaling when signaling
induces the human capital investment? Is it socially benecial or harmful to promote the
human capital investment by increasing costly signaling?
Motivated by these questions, this paper recasts the classic signaling model by Spence
(1973) in a dynamic framework where human capital and signaling have a causal rela-
tionship: human capital investment is necessary to reduce the marginal cost of signaling.
1For example, using a unique data set containing the General Educational Development (GED) test
scores, Tyler, Murnane and Willett (2000) identify the signaling value of the GED, net of human capital
e¤ects. They observe that there are substantial signaling e¤ects for young white dropouts, estimated at
about 20% earnings gain after 5 years.
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Two aspects of education are thus sequentially decomposed in the model: education level
acts solely as signaling and the marginal cost of education (signaling) is conditional on
whether the worker has undertaken the human capital investment. We consider a two-
type model in which a workers high or low type is determined according to the presence
or absence of the human capital investment. When a worker contemplates whether to
make a human capital investment, he compares the cost and benet of the investment.
The cost occurs together with the investment. The cost level, exogenously drawn from an
interval, depends on the workers aggregate endowment such as innate intellect, maturity,
initial wealth, and parental environment. The benet of the investment is delivered later
when signaling is less costly and wage is determined based on signaling. Consequently, our
model contains two distinct features: (i) the choice of signaling a¤ects the level of human
capital investment and (ii) the proportion of high and low type in the entire workers is
endogenously determined.2
We are primarily interested in separating and pooling equilibria. These two kinds
of equilibria contain two contrasting forms of signaling: separating signaling and pool-
ing signaling.3 Each equilibrium is classied as an interior equilibrium or a boundary
equilibrium: in an interior equilibrium, a positive fraction of workers are motivated to
make the human capital investment and become high type, whereas in a boundary equi-
librium, workers select no costly signaling and make no human capital investment. Under
some mild assumptions, we characterize an interior separating equilibrium and an inte-
rior pooling equilibrium, and then establish conditions under which each type of interior
equilibrium is sure to exist and fails to exist. We associate a separating or pooling signal-
ing with an interior separating or pooling equilibrium that exists under the governments
market design: we assume that the government acts as a market maker and implements a
certain signaling through the equilibrium that exists under its market design. A rationale
for this intervention is that it can signicantly increase the set of implementable signaling
under the Cho-Krepsintuitive criterion (see Cho and Kreps (1987)) by expanding the
2The features shown in this paper might provide some clues as to why the existing literature that
attempted to test the two aspects of education, including the aforementioned papers, faces the di¢ culty
of identifying one aspect of education from the other aspect.
3Two di¤erent natures of signaling may also be referred to as separating education and pooling edu-
cation given that education acts as signaling in the model.
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scope of parameters in which there exists an interior separating or pooling equilibrium
that satises the criterion.
With these analyses in hand, we present welfare analyses of two kinds of signaling.
Indeed, the social value of signaling has long been challenged: the signaling aspect of
education is wasteful from the perspective of welfare. We conrm that this view is valid
in a benchmark model where signaling choice has no e¤ect on the human capital investment
so that the proportion of two types is exogenously determined. In contrast with this view,
we use each interior equilibrium in our original model and show that the signaling aspect
of education is justiable from the perspective of welfare: this seemingly wasteful action
becomes socially benecial when it induces any human capital investment by delivering
the benets of the investment.
We next characterize the signaling that maximizes the social welfare in each interior
equilibrium. In an interior separating equilibrium, it is socially benecial to maximize
the human capital investment: since the investment can be promoted by increasing the
utility gain that a worker expects from undertaking the investment and becoming high
type, the least costly signaling for high type maximizes the social welfare. In an interior
pooling equilibrium, however, it may be socially harmful to maximize the human capital
investment: an increase in pooling signaling improves the social welfare by promoting the
human capital investment, but it also worsens the welfare by increasing the signaling cost
of a worker with low type. We nd that an interior pooling equilibrium su¤ers from an
oversignaling if an additional human capital (marginal increase in the fraction of high
type) resulting from an increase in the signaling is su¢ ciently small.
We then compare two contrasting forms of signaling by associating a separating sig-
naling with an interior separating equilibrium and associating a pooling signaling with an
interior pooling equilibrium. We begin by observing that an interior separating equilib-
rium uses a higher signaling level than does an interior pooling equilibrium: the separating
signaling that ensures high type must be higher than any pooling signaling that ensures
the expected type of all workers.4 We nd that a separating signaling, despite its use of
a higher signaling level, does not necessarily generate the human capital investment more
4A pooling signaling can approximate a separating signaling for high type only when the fraction of
workers with high type approches one.
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than a pooling signaling: if the signaling for high type grows higher, then the signaling
cost for high type also becomes larger and thus workers become less encouraged from
making the human capital investment and becoming high type. The signaling aspect of
education is socially benecial in an interior equilibrium, as we state above, and it may
be better represented by a separating signaling than by a pooling signaling in that private
information about individual types is conveyed by the separating signaling. From the
perspective of welfare, however, we nd that a separating signaling may be inferior to a
pooling signaling, without a larger inducement of the human capital investment.
We further formalize this argument and specify conditions under which we can rank
two types of signaling in terms of social welfare. Our starting point of comparison is
based on the condition that ensures the existence of an interior pooling equilibrium that
approximates the full investment and makes the fraction of high type close to one.5 We
then establish our ndings in two logical steps. First, we observe that the very best of
all possible interior separating equilibria, by motivating most of workers to have only one
type (high type), approaches an interior pooling equilibrium that approximates the full
investment. Second, we show that a pooling signaling is strictly better than a separating
signaling in terms of social welfare under two circumstances: (i) an additional separating
signaling reduces human capital (the fraction of high type) by making the signaling cost
for high type too high, so that an interior separating equilibrium fails to approximate the
full investment, and (ii) even when an interior separating equilibrium can approximate
the full investment, it approaches an interior pooling equilibrium that is too costly to
implement and su¤ers from an overinvestment.
It seems socially benecial to motivate more workers to undertake the human capi-
tal investment; in fact, an interior separating equilibrium maximizes the human capital
investment to maximize the social welfare. We nd, however, that it may be socially
harmful to stay with the separating signaling: before an interior separating equilibrium
approaches an interior pooling equilibrium that approximates the full investment and suf-
fers from an overinvestment, then it is socially benecial to switch from the separating
signaling to a pooling signaling and moderate the investment level. On the other hand,
5It is impossible that every worker becomes high type in equilibrium: if every worker has high type,
the use of costly signaling has no gain, and with no use of signaling, there will be no human capital
investment since its benet cannot be delivered by signaling.
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we also nd that, if a separating signaling still generates a su¢ ciently small incentive to
make the human capital investment, then it is socially benecial to continue to use the
separating signaling and focus on promoting the investment: a pooling signaling may then
su¤er from an underinvestment by failing to provide any incentive to make the human
capital investment or by inducing too little incentive.
The relationship between signaling and human capital investment has not received a
well-deserved attention from the existing literature. Despite extensive studies of human
capital investment and prevalent uses of signaling models, theoretical papers have rarely
considered a potential relationship between the two aspects.6 We nd that the causal
relationship assumed in the model, a seemingly natural and yet surprisingly rare extension
of the Spences (1973) model, provides a new insight into the choice of a proper form of
signaling from the perspective of social welfare: whether it is socially benecial or wasteful
to convey private information about individual types in the form of a separating signaling,
as opposed to a pooling signaling, is dependent on how each form of signaling promotes
the human capital investment. This explanatory variable has long been missing in the
literature.
This paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2. We then
characterize interior equilibria and present the existence of each interior equilibrium in
Section 3. In Section 4, we o¤er welfare analyses of signaling in the benchmark model and
in our original model, and characterize the welfare-maximizing signaling in each interior
equilibrium. In Section 5, we present circumstances under which we can rank two forms
of signaling in terms of social welfare. We conclude in Section 6.
6In broad terms, our model is related to Daley and Green (2013) in their working paper version that
includes the pre-investment stage. They introduce an additional noisy signal, grade, which enables them to
apply an equilibrium selection criterion, and they examine how the selected equilibrium changes with the
noisy signal. Our model has no noisy signal, and inherits Spences framework with minimal assumptions
by adding the pre-invesment stage. Under government intervention, we study both separating and pooling
equilibria, and furthermore, our main focus is market design; conditions that induce more human capital
investment and higher social welfare given a population distribution. We also use the Cho-Krepsintuitive
criterion for an equilibrium selection under government intervention.
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2 Model
We consider a unit mass of ex ante identical workers. Each worker endogenously decides
whether to make a human capital investment with which to determine his own type q 2
fH;Lg that will be appraised in the future. If a worker makes the investment, he incurs the
cost c. The level of c represents a composite cost and depends on the workers aggregate
endowment such as innate intellect, maturity, initial wealth, and parental environment.
We assume that the cost c is exogenously drawn from an absolutely continuous distribution
function G with the support [c; c], where c > c  0. The density g  G0 is everywhere
positive. After making the choice of type q 2 fH;Lg that is private information and
is conditional on the investment decision, a worker selects education e 2 R+ that is
public information and acts solely as signaling. The worker then participates in the labor
market where two risk-neutral rms engage in a Bertrand-style competition and o¤er
wages simultaneously. The worker earns wage w 2 R+ if he is hired by one of two rms.
The worker has utility 0 from outside options. Each rm obtains the value yq 2 R+ if it
employs a worker with type q 2 fH;Lg, where yH > yL.
A worker with type q 2 fH;Lg has a continuous utility function uq (w; e) that is
strictly increasing in w and strictly decreasing in e. We assume that a worker with type
H has a lower marginal cost of signaling (education) than does a worker with type L: if
e0 > e, then
uH (w; e
0)  uH (w; e) > uL (w; e0)  uL (w; e) . (1)
This inequality means that uq (w; e) satises the Spence-Mirrlees property (SMP). We
also assume that type q is relevant only for education e so that uq (w; e) does not have
any cross e¤ectbetween q and w. In other words, the utility gain associated with any
wage increase is type-irrelevant:7 if w0 > w, then
uH (w
0; e)  uH (w; e) = uL (w0; e)  uL (w; e) . (2)
In addition, for no education e = 0, it is reasonable to assume that the level of utility
is type-irrelvant: uH (w; 0) = uL (w; 0). This assumption and SMP imply uH (w; e) >
uL (w; e) for all e > 0.
7This assumption is satised for all separable utility functions such that uq (w; e) = v(w)  cq (e) for
any increasing function v (), which is widely used in many applications and textbooks.
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The time line is described as follows:
Time 1. Nature chooses c.
Time 2. Each worker chooses type q.
Time 3. Each worker chooses signal e.
Time 4. The two rms simultaneously make wage o¤ers.
Time 5. Each worker accepts the highest wage and produces. If indi¤erent, he chooses
each rm with equal probability.
The workers investment strategy at time 2, Q (c), is a mapping Q : [c; c] ! fH;Lg,
and the workers education strategy at time 3, E (q), is a mapping E : fH;Lg ! R+.
Time 2 represents the stage of the human capital investment and time 3 represents the
signaling stage. When a worker contemplates undertaking a human capital investment
at time 2 to determine q 2 fH;Lg, he compares the cost and benet of the investment.
As we present below, the equilibrium strategy Q takes the form of a cuto¤ strategy:
there exists a threshold cost level k such that workers with cost c make the investment
(no investment) if c < k (if c > k). An equilibrium is called an interior equilibrium
when it has the threshold k on an interior point of the support [c; c], k 2 (c; c), so that
some fraction of the population interval [c; c] is motivated to make the investment and
become typeH. An equilibrium is called a boundary equilibrium when it has the threshold
k =2 (c; c). Each rms strategy at time 4, wi (e), is a mapping wi : R+ ! R+ for i = 1; 2.
The rms form (common posterior) beliefs  (e), the probability of q = H, after observing
e in equilibrium. Given the labor-market competition assumed above, in equilibrium, each
rms strategy must satisfy w (e) = wi (e) =  (e) yH + (1   (e)) yL for all i.
A strategy prole f(Q (c) ; E (q)); w (e)g is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if in each
time line, the strategy of each player is the best response to the other playersstrategies,
and rmsbeliefs about the workers quality are updated by the Bayes rule whenever
possible.8
8Formally, a set of strategies f(Q (c) ; E (q)); (wi (e))2i=1g and a belief function  (e) constitute a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium if:
(i) (Q (c) ; E (q)) is optimal for the worker given (wi (e))
2
i=1
(ii)  (e) is derived from E (q) via the Bayesrule where possible
(iii) (wi (e))
2
i=1 is a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game in which both rms make wage
o¤ers to the worker knowing that q = H with probability  (e).
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We are primarily interested in separating and pooling equilibria. Each equilibrium
is classied as an interior equilibrium or a boundary equilibrium. For now, we focus
on interior equilibria and characterize these two kinds of interior equilibria. Consider
rst the signaling stage. For separating equilibria, let eH  E (H) 6= eL  E (L). The
Bayesrule entails that  (eH) = 1 and  (eL) = 0 on the equilibrium path; thus, yH (yL)
becomes the wage for type H (type L) and the worker with type L maximizes his utility
by selecting eL = 0. For pooling equilibria, let e  E (H) = E (L). The Bayes rule
entails that  (e) =  on the equilibrium path, where  denotes the proportion of type H;
thus, E [y] = yH + (1  ) yL becomes an expected wage of both types. An important
feature of our model is that  is not exogenously given but endogenously determined by
the investment decision in equilibrium.
Incentive compatibility conditions for separating and pooling equilibria are respectively
described by
uH (yH ; eH)  uH (yL; 0) and uL (yL; 0)  uL (yH ; eH) , (3)
and
uH(E [y] ; e)  uH (yL; 0) and uL(E [y] ; e)  uL (yL; 0) . (4)
For separating equilibria, we can obtain the boundaries of eH when two constraints in (3)
are binding. Dene eH by uL (yL; 0) = uL (yH ; eH) and eH by uH (yH ; eH) = uH (yL; 0).
From the assumption uL (yL; 0) = uH (yL; 0), we nd that eH > eH > 0 and interior
separating equilibria have the range of eH :
eH 2 [eH ; eH ]. (5)
For pooling equilibria, we use the binding constraint for type L and dene the upper
bound e () by
uL(E [y] ; e ()) = uL (yL; 0) , (6)
and nd that interior pooling equilibria have the range of e:
e 2 [0; e ()]. (7)
If  < 1 in a pooling equilibrium, then the intervals for eH and e in (5) and (7) do not
overlap: eH > e () since uL (yH ; eH) = uL (yL; 0) = uL
 
E [y] ; e ()

and yH > E [y] for
 < 1.
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Consider next the stage of the human capital investment. For separating equilibria,
if a worker selects q = H by making the investment and incurring the cost c, then he
has utility uH (yH ; eH)   c and if a worker selects q = L by making no investment, then
he has utility uL (yL; 0). Hence, an interior separating equilibrium has the threshold of
undertaking the investment:
ks = uH(yH ; eH)  uL(yL; 0). (8)
This value ks represents the utility gain that a worker enjoys when he makes the investment
in an interior separating equilibrium where ks 2 (c; c) and G(ks) 2 (0; 1). This value may
thus be called the workers incentive to make the investment in an interior separating
equilibrium. The following lemma reports a distinct feature of our model: the separating
signaling eH a¤ects the human capital investment. It shows that an increase in the
signaling eH 2 [eH ; eH ] reduces the workers incentive to make the investment since it
increases the signaling cost of eH and thus decreases the utility gain from becoming type
H.
Lemma 1 In an interior separating equilibrium, the threshold ks is a strictly decreasing
function of eH 2 [eH ; eH ].
Similarly, for pooling equilibria, if a worker selects q = H by making the investment,
then he has utility uH(E [y] ; e) c and if a worker selects q = L by making no investment,
then he has utility uL(E [y] ; e). Hence, an interior pooling equilibrium has the threshold
of undertaking the investment:
kp = uH(E [y] ; e)  uL(E [y] ; e). (9)
This value kp represents the utility gain that a worker enjoys when he makes the investment
in an interior pooling equilibrium where kp 2 (c; c) andG(kp) 2 (0; 1). This value may thus
be called the workers incentive to make the investment in an interior pooling equilibrium.
Since the utility gain from any wage increase is type-irrelevant by assumption in (2),
uH(E [y] ; e)  uL(E [y] ; e) = uH(0; e)  uL(0; e),
the value kp becomes the signaling cost advantage for type H:
kp = uH(0; e)  uL(0; e). (10)
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In the following lemma, we report that the pooling signaling e also a¤ects the human
capital investment: an increase in e enlarges the signaling cost advantage for type H,
which encourages workers to make the investment and become type H.
Lemma 2 In an interior pooling equilibrium, the threshold kp is a strictly increasing
function of e 2 [0; e ()].
In an interior separating or pooling equilibrium, the respective fraction of type H is
endogenously determined by the respective distribution function:
G(ks) = G(uH (yH ; eH)  uL (yL; 0)) (11)
G(kp) = G(uH (0; e)  uL (0; e)). (12)




G(ks) = G(uH (yH ; e

H)  uL (yL; 0)) 2 (0; 1) and eH 2 [eH ; eH ]: (13)
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A worker, when contemplating whether to make the human capital investment, compares
the consequent cost and gain. While the cost is directly incurred, the gain is delivered
later by the use of signaling. In each interior equilibrium, there are some fraction of
workers who nd it protable to undertake the investment.
We nally consider boundary equilibria.9 We proceed to present a boundary equilib-
rium in which no human capital investment is made for any c 2 [c; c]. If this no-investment
equilibrium exists, then a worker has type L and enjoys utility uL(yL; e0) for any signaling
level e0; the worker thus selects no costly signaling, e0 = 0. Further, in the absence of
9If there is no interior separating equilibrium, then uH (yH ; eH)   uL (yL; 0)  c or uH (yH ; eH)  
uL (yL; 0)  c is necessary. If there is no interior pooling equilibrium, then uH (0; e)   uL (0; e)  c or
uH (0; e)   uL (0; e)  c is necessary. Thus, if there is no interior equilibrium, or if there is a boundary
equilibrium, then the equation (11) or (12) is still satised.
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signaling (e0 = 0), the worker makes no human capital investment since its benet is
not delivered. Hence, the boundary equilibrium with no human capital and no signaling,
denoted by (k0; e

0), always exists and satises G(k

0) = 0 and e

0 = 0. We next consider a
boundary equilibrium in which the human capital investment is made for all c 2 [c; c]. If
this full-investment equilibrium exists, then a worker has typeH and has utility uH(yH ; e1)
for any signaling level e1; the worker thus selects no costly signaling, e1 = 0. With no
signaling (e1 = 0), however, the worker makes no human capital investment, which causes
a contradiction. Hence, the boundary equilibrium with the full investment does not exist.
We now report the existence and uniqueness of boundary equilibrium.





0) = 0 and e

0 = 0.
Due to this proposition, the analysis of boundary equilibrium is greatly simplied:
the boundary equilibrium has no signaling and no investment. The nonexistence of the
full investment equilibrium shows that the fraction of type H must be below 1 in any
separating or pooling equilibrium.
3 Interior equilibria
The existence of boundary equilibrium was established in the previous section. In this
section, we establish the existence of interior equilibria and also associate an interior
equilibrium with the equilibrium that exists under a government intervention. To simplify
analysis, we henceforth assume that uq is di¤erentiable.
3.1 Existence of interior equilibria
The existence of an interior separating equilibrium involves two conditions in (13): an
interior separating equilibrium exists if and only if ks 2 (c; c) and eH 2 [eH ; eH ]. For
now, we are interested in the condition under which there exists an interior separating
equilibrium with the least costly education level eH that satises Cho-Kreps criterion
(Cho and Kreps (1987)). To search for the condition, recall that the incentive to make
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the human capital investment, represented by ks, is strictly decreasing in eH 2 [eH ; eH ].
The threshold ks thus has the maximum ks when eH = eH ,
ks = uH (yH ; eH)  uL (yL; 0) = uH(yH ; eH)  uL(yH ; eH);
where the second equality follows from the denition of eH , uL (yL; 0) = uL (yH ; eH). Since
the utility gain from wage increase is type-irrelevant, the investment gain becomes the
signaling cost advantage for type H for the education level eH ,
ks = uH (0; eH)  uL (0; eH) ; (15)
where ks > 0 since eH > 0. We now formally present a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for the existence of an interior separating equilibrium with eH .
Proposition 2 There exists an interior separating equilibrium with eH if and only if
[uH (0; eH)  uL (0; eH)] 2 (c; c).
The existence of an interior pooling equilibrium involves two conditions in (14). To
simplify notations, we dene the distribution function:
D(e)  G(uH (0; e)  uL (0; e)): (16)
Observing that this function D(e) is strictly increasing in e 2 [0; e ()] for any D(e) 2
(0; 1), the following proposition provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the exis-
tence of an interior pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 3 There exists an interior pooling equilibrium if and only if D (e ())  
for some  2 (0; 1).
Proof. Suppose rst that there exists  2 (0; 1) such that D (e ())  . Dene a
correspondence 	 : [0; 1]  [0; 1] using (14) such that
	 ()  fx 2 [0; 1] : x = D (e) for e 2 [0; e ()]g.
Thus, an equilibrium fraction of type H, , is a xed point of 	,  2 	 (). Since
D (e) 2 (0; 1) is an increasing function of e, the correspondence can be rewritten as




)))(,0())(,0(( ll eueuG LH -
1l 2l 3l
Figure 1: Two intervals of equilirium proportions
 2 	 () and  kp; e is derived from G  kp = D (e) = . Suppose next that there
exists an interior pooling equilibrium and D (e ()) <  for all  2 (0; 1). Then only a
boundary pooling equilibrium with  = 0 or  = 1 exists, which causes a contradiction.
Figure 1 depicts the case with two sets of equilibrium proportions, [0; 1] and [2; 3],
where the dotted area below the curved line,
D(e()) = G(uH (0; e ())  uL (0; e ()));
represents the correspondence 	 (). The function D (e ()) in Figure 1 is strictly increas-
ing in  for all  2 (0; 1). As we show later, however, this function may be constant for
some . For now, we can show that D(e()) is strictly increasing in  in the range of 
where D(e()) 2 (0; 1), or equivalently [uH (0; e ())  uL (0; e ())] 2 (c; c). From (6), we
know that e () is dened by
uL(yL + B; e ()) = uL(yL; 0); (17)
where B  yH   yL and yL + B = E [y]. It follows from (17) that the upper bound
e() must be strictly increasing in  for all  2 (0; 1) with the endpoints, e (0) = 0 and
e (1) = eH . This strictly increasing e() in turn implies that the value uH(0; e())  
uL(0; e()) is also strictly increasing in  for all  2 (0; 1). Thus, in the range of  where
D(e()) 2 (0; 1), we can be sure that D(e()) is strictly increasing in . In addition,
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the function D (e ()) shifts up if the productivity yH becomes greater: an increase in
yH raises E [y] and e () given . For an increase in yH , this function shifts more if the
signaling cost gap, uH (0; e)  uL (0; e), is larger.
We now identify some su¢ cient conditions under which an interior pooling equilibrium
exists.
Corollary 1 If yH is su¢ ciently large given yL, if lim!0 dD (e ()) =d > 1, or if
D (e (1)) = 1 and lim!1 dD (e ()) =d < 1, then there exists an interior pooling equilib-
rium.
Proof. If yH increases given yL, then yL+B increases in (17) and, to satisfy (17), e ()
increases for  2 (0; 1) and e (1) = eH also increases.10 Hence, for any  2 (0; 1), we can
nd yH such that uH (0; e ())  uL (0; e ()) is su¢ ciently large and D (e ())   holds.
For the second condition, we observe D (e (0)) = 0 since e (0) = 0. Now, D (e (0)) = 0
and lim!0 dD (e ()) =d > 1 imply D (e ()) >  for  su¢ ciently small. Similarly,
D (e (1)) = 1 and lim!1 dD (e ()) =d < 1 imply D (e ()) >  for  su¢ ciently large.
We next use Proposition 2 and 3 to present a necessary and su¢ cient condition under
which an interior separating equilibrium with eH and an interior pooling equilibrium exist
at the same time.
Corollary 2 There exist an interior pooling equilibrium and an interior separating equi-
librium with eH if and only if D (e ())   for some  > 0 and D (e (1)) < 1.
Proof. We rst rewrite the condition ks 2 (c; c) in Proposition 2 as D (e (1)) 2 (0; 1)
since D(e(1)) = D(eH) = G(ks) from uL(yH ; eH) = uL(yL; 0) = uL(E[y]; e()). Now,
the conditions in Proposition 2 and 3 become D (e ())   for some  2 (0; 1) and
D (e (1)) 2 (0; 1). We next observe that the condition, D (e ())   for some  > 0,
already includes the condition D (e (1)) > 0 since D(e(1))  D(e())   > 0. In
addition, D (e (1)) < 1 implies that  satisfying the condition, D (e ())   for some
 > 0, must be less than 1. Hence, the conditions in Proposition 2 and 3 are equivalent
to the conditions stated in this corollary.
10Similarly, if E [y] is su¢ ciently large given , then there exists an interior pooling equilibrium.
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3.2 Exclusivity of interior equilibria
In this subsection, we examine the existence of interior equilibria conditional on the level
of uH (0; eH) uL (0; eH). We also show that the existence of interior equilibria is mutually
exclusive to some degree: in some parameter range, one type of interior equilibrium fails
to exist while the other type exists.
First, suppose that
uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH)  c: (18)
Proposition 2 then implies that there is no interior separating equilibrium with eH : if
eH = eH , then ks = uH(yH ; eH)   uL(yL; 0) = uH (0; eH)   uL (0; eH) which is lower
than any interior point of [c; c] under the inequality. This nonexistence extends for any
separating equilibrium: since ks = uH(yH ; eH)   uL(yL; 0) is strictly decreasing in eH 2
[eH ; eH ], if there is no separating equilibrium with eH , there is no interior separating
equilibrium with eH 2 (eH ; eH ]. Further, there is no interior pooling equilibrium: if an
interior pooling equilibrium with e exists, then kp = uH(0; e) uL(0; e) 2 (c; c) and e < eH
are necessary but impossible to satisfy since uH(0; e)   uL(0; e) is strictly increasing in
e. Thus, under the condition (18), there is no interior separating or pooling equilibrium.
Instead, there exists the boundary equilibrium (k0; e

0) with no signaling and no human
capital investment.
Second, suppose that
uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH) > c: (19)
Then the separating equilibrium with eH cannot exist: if eH = eH , then ks = uH(0; eH) 
uL(0; eH) which is above any interior point of [c; c] under the inequality. For the existence
of a pooling equilibrium, we characterize the function:
D (e ()) = G(uH (0; e ())  uL (0; e ())):
Since e() is strictly increasing in  with e (0) = 0 and e (1) = eH , the value uH(0; e()) 
uL(0; e()) is also strictly increasing in  with
uH(0; e(0))  uL(0; e(0)) = 0
uH(0; e(1))  uL(0; e(1)) > c:
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Thus, there exists a unique  2 (0; 1) such that
uH(0; e())  uL(0; e()) = c; (20)
where e() < e(1) = eH . The use of a pooling signaling e is restricted to the relevant range
e < e(); since no pooling equilibrium uses the signaling e 2 [e(); e(1)], the distribution
function D (e ()) must be constant, D (e ()) = 1, for all  2 [; 1]. We can similarly
nd that there exists a unique  2 [0; ) such that
uH(0; e())  uL(0; e()) = c: (21)
We now have a complete characterization of D (e ()) under (19): D (e ()) = 0 for all
  , the function D (e ()) is strictly increasing in  for all  2 (; ), and D (e ()) = 1
for all  2 [; 1]. This characterization implies D (e ())   for  su¢ ciently large. Thus,
under the condition (19), there exists no separating equilibrium with eH , but there exists
an interior pooling equilibrium.
Third, suppose that
uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH) = c; (22)
which corresponds to  = 1 in (20): D (e ()) = 0 for all   , the function D (e ())
strictly increases in  for all  2 (; 1) andD (e (1)) = 1. We know from Proposition 2 that
the separating equilibrium with eH cannot exist, but we are not sure whether an interior
pooling equilibrium exists. Under (22), given D (e (1)) = 1, if lim!1 dD (e ()) =d < 1,
then D (e ())   for  su¢ ciently large, which ensures the existence of an interior




























follows from the denition of e (), uL(yL + B; e ()) = uL(yL; 0). The slope in (23) is
su¢ ciently small if the density at the top g(c) is su¢ ciently small since lim!1 g(kp()) =
g(c). Thus, under the condition (22), if g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then there exists no
separating equilibrium with eH , but there exists an interior pooling equilibrium.
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Lastly, suppose that
[uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH)] 2 (c; c): (24)
Then there exists  2 [0; 1) such that D (e ()) = 0 for  2 [0; ], the function D (e ())
is strictly increasing in  for  2 (; 1] and D (e (1)) 2 (0; 1). We know from Proposi-
tion 2 that the separating equilibrium with eH exists, but we are not sure whether an
interior pooling equilibrium exists. Proposition 3 shows that there is no interior pooling
equilibrium if D (e ()) <  for all  2 (0; 1). If the value uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH) gets
su¢ ciently close to c, then D (e (1)) approaches zero. Thus, under the condition (24), if
uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH) is su¢ ciently close to c and lim! dD (e ()) =d < 1, then there
exists no interior pooling equilibrium, but there exists the separating equilibrium with eH .
The slope lim! dD (e ()) =d < 1 if g(c) is su¢ ciently small since lim! g(kp) = g(c).11
We now summarize our ndings.
Proposition 4 (i) If uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH)  c, then there exists no interior separating
or pooling equilibrium. (ii) If uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH) > c, or if uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH) = c
and g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then there exists no interior separating equilibrium with eH
while there exists an interior pooling equilibrium. (iii) If [uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH)] 2 (c;bc)
for some bc su¢ ciently close to c and g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then there exists no interior
pooling equilibrium while there exists the interior separating equilibrium with eH .
In this and following sections, we occasionally illustrate our ndings in association with
the productivity gap, B = yH   yL. For this particular comparative static analysis, we
focus on the case in which yH increases given yL.12 From the denition of eH , uL(yH ; eH) =
uL(yL; 0), we nd that, if B ! 0, then eH ! 0, and if B increases, then eH also increases.
This relationship between B and eH indicates that uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH) is a strictly
increasing function of B and that there exists a unique critical value B such that
uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH) = c;
11If c is su¢ ciently large, then this additional assumption on the density g(c) is not necessary. We
make the assumption on g(c) given the possibility that c is su¢ ciently small.
12There are many ways in which B increases. For example, (i) yH increases given yL, and (ii) yL
decreases given yH . We can greatly simplify our analysis by focusing on (i), not mixing (i) and (ii), since
uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH) is then monotonically increasing in B. Notice also that this monotonic property
directly holds, regardless of the way B changes, if uq is a linear function of w.
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and there exists a unique value B such that
uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH) = c:
Therefore, when yH increase given yL, the results in Proposition 4 can be presented
conditional on B. For example, if B  B, then uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH)  c, if B > B, then
uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH) > c, and if B = B, then uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH) = c.
The following example describes the relationship between uH (0; eH)  uL (0; eH) and
B. Suppose that the workers utility function is separable and represented by
uq (w; e) = w   cq (e) for q 2 fL;Hg; (25)
where the educational cost cq (e) takes quadratic forms, cL (e) = e2 and cH (e) = ae2, with
a 2 (0; 1). Suppose also that G is a uniform distribution G(c) = c with its support [0; 1].
From uL (yL; 0) = uL (yH ; eH), we nd eH =
p
B and ks is strictly increasing in B:
ks = uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH) = (1  a)(eH)2 = (1  a)B:
From (1   a)B = c = 0 and (1   a)B = c = 1, we nd the critical values B = 0 and
B = 1=(1  a).
We conclude this subsection by making some remarks. First, the value uH(0; eH)  
uL(0; eH) is a¤ected not only by the productivity gap B but by the signaling cost gap. In
the example shown above, since uH(0; eH) uL(0; eH) = (1 a)B, the existence of interior
equilibria presented above may also be conditional on (1   a)B.13 Second, the interior
separating equilibrium with the least costly signaling for type H, eH , that satises Cho-
Krepscriterion exists in a limited parameter range. As two propositions show above, the
interior separating equilibrium with eH exists only when [uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH)] 2 (c; c).
In the example, the interior separating equilibrium with eH exists only in the range
(1   a)B < c = 1. Third, the existence of the interior separating equilibrium with eH
and an interior pooling equilibrium is mutually exclusive to some degree. A su¢ ciently
large uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH) excludes the existence of the interior separating equilibrium
with eH , whereas a small uH(0; eH) uL(0; eH) close to c may exclude the existence of an
13As noted above, we illustrate our ndings conditional on the level of B. Under the untility function
in (25), those same ndings may also be conditional on the level of (1  a)B.
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Figure 2: (1  a)B > 1 and (1  a)B < 1 under uniform G.
interior pooling equilibrium. In the example, the existence of these two interior equilibria
is entirely exclusive. For an interior pooling equilibrium, we nd the value:
kp = uH (0; e)  uL (0; e) = cL (e)  cH (e) = (1  a)e2.
The signaling e in an interior pooling equilibrium is bounded and satises kp = (1 a)e2 <
c = 1. Under the uniform distribution of G, the function D(e) becomes
D(e) = G (uH (0; e)  uL (0; e)) = minf(1  a)e2; 1g:




D(e ()) = minf(1  a)B; 1g:
As Figure 2 shows, the condition D(e ())   holds for any  2 (0; 1) only in the
parameter range (1  a)B  1 where the interior separating equilibrium with eH cannot
exist. In this parameter range, any combination (kp; e
) that satises kp = (1  a)e2 and
kp 2 (0; 1) is an interior pooling equilibrium.
3.3 Interior equilibria under market maker
We associate a separating or pooling signaling with an interior separating or pooling equi-
librium that exists under the governments market design: we assume that the government
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acts as a market maker and implements a certain signaling through the equilibrium that
exists under its market design. A rationale for this intervention is that it can signicantly
increase the set of implementable signaling under the Cho-Krepsintuitive criterion by
expanding the scope of parameters in which there exists an interior separating or pooling
equilibrium that satises the criterion. In this subsection, we formalize this argument un-
der the assumption: the governments market design takes the form of restricting signaling
choices to a set,
f0g [ [E;E]; (26)
where E;E 2 R+ and E  E.
We rst broaden our attention beyond the interior separating equilibrium with eH by
showing that, if uH (0; eH) uL (0; eH) > c, then an interior separating equilibrium always
exists. If [uH (0; eH)   uL (0; eH)] 2 (c; c), then the interior separating equilibrium with
eH exists. If uH (0; eH)  uL (0; eH)  c, then the interior separating equilibrium with eH
cannot exist, but an interior separating equilibrium with eH 2 (eH ; eH ] exists: since eH is
dened by uH (yH ; eH) = uH (yL; 0), if eH increases above eH and approaches eH , then ks =
uH(yH ; eH)  uL(yL; 0) monotonically decreases and approaches uH(yL; 0)  uL(yL; 0) = 0
where 0  c. Intuitively, an increase in the signaling cost of eH decreases the incentive
to make the human capital investment, and if eH ! eH , then the incentive diminishes to
zero since workers then nd it indi¤erent to become type H and L.14
We now associate an interior separating equilibrium with eH 2 [eH ; eH ] with the equi-
librium that exists under the governments market design (26): f0g [ [E;E] is hereafter
called the market design (S) when a point (ks ; e

H) = (uH(yH ; E)   uL(yL; 0); E) satis-
es (13) and thus constitutes an interior separating equilibrium under f0g [ [E;E]. The
market design (S) selects E such that (i) the point (ks ; e

H) is a unique interior separat-
ing equilibrium that satises the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, since there is no lower
14Consider the previous example where the utility function is (25) and G is a uniform distribution
G(c) = c with its support [0; 1]. From uL (yL; 0) = uL (yH ; eH) and uH (yH ; eH) = uH (yL; 0), we can
derive two bounds: eH =
p
B and eH =
p
B=a. Using ks = uH (yH ; eH) uL (yL; 0) = B a(eH)2, we can
derive the corresponding range of the threshold: ks 2 [0; (1  a)B]. Thus, if ks = (1  a)B < c = 1, there
exists the interior separating equilibrium with eH , and if ks = (1  a)B  c = 1, there exists no interior
separating equilibrium with eH , but there exists an interior separating equilibrium with eH 2 (eH ; eH ];
the threshold ks decreases below c when eH increases above eH .
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education level below E to which a worker with type H can gain by deviating, and (ii)
there exists no interior pooling equilibrium, since any interior pooling equilibrium with e
satises e < eH  E = eH .
We next associate an interior pooling equilibrium with the equilibrium that exists un-
der the governments market design (26): f0g[[E;E] is hereafter called the market design
(P) when a point (kp; e
) = (uH(0; E)   uL(0; E); E) satises (14) and thus constitutes
an interior pooling equilibrium under f0g [ [E;E]. The market design (P) selects E such
that (i) the point (kp; e
) is an interior pooling equilibrium that satises the Cho-Kreps
intuitive criterion, since there is no higher education level above E to which a worker
with type H can deviate, and (ii) there exists no interior separating equilibrium, since
any interior separating equilibrium with eH satises eH > e(
)  e = E.15
The following proposition summarizes the uniqueness results.
Proposition 5 Under the market design (S), the selected interior separating equilibrium
is a unique interior equilibrium that satises the Cho-Krepsintuitive criterion. Under the
market design (P), the selected interior pooling equilibrium is a unique interior equilibrium
that satises the Cho-Krepsintuitive criterion for uL that has a su¢ ciently large marginal
cost of education.
4 Signaling and social welfare
The social value of signaling has long been challenged: the signaling aspect of education
is wasteful from the perspective of welfare. In this section, we use interior equilibria and
show that this seemingly wasteful action becomes socially benecial with its inducement
of the other aspect of education, human capital investment. We then characterize the
welfare-maximizing signaling in each interior equilibrium.
15Notice that the uniqueness of an interior pooling equilibrium is not reported in the nding (i). As
Proposition 5 shows, this uniqueness is ensured by an assumption: uL has su¢ ciently large marginal cost
of education. A formal proof for our ndings is in the Appendix.
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4.1 Role of human capital investment
We consider the benchmark signaling model in which the aspect of human capital in-
vestment is entirely disregarded. An essential feature of this benchmark model is that
signaling choice has no e¤ect on the human capital investment: q 2 fL;Hg is determined
by the prior proportion  2 (0; 1). Other than this feature, we can directly use the pre-
vious characterization: a separating equilibrium has eL = 0 and eH 2 [eH ; eH ], and a
pooling equilibrium has e 2 [0; e ()].
We use the benchmark model and show that the signaling aspect of education can
hardly be justied from the perspective of welfare: it is socially wasteful without its e¤ect
on the human capital investment. To present this benchmark result, we describe the social
welfare. A separating equilibrium (eL; eH) generates the social welfare:
uH (yH ; eH) + (1  )uL (yL; 0) :
Since uH (yH ; eH) is strictly decreasing in eH 2 [eH ; eH ], the optimal separating equilib-
rium is (eL; eH) = (0; eH) that satises the intuitive criterion and generates the social
welfare:
UBs = uH (yH ; eH) + (1  )uL (yL; 0) : (27)
A pooling equilibrium, eH = eL = e, generates the social welfare:
UBp = uH
 




E [y] ; e

: (28)
In comparison, the zero education (no signaling) leads to the same wage E [y] and gen-
erates the social welfare:
UB0 = uH
 




E [y] ; 0

:
We now make the following comparison while providing the proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 In the benchmark model, signaling is socially wasteful; (i) if uL is con-
cave in w, then the ban on education (no signaling) is strictly better than any separating
equilibrium in terms of social welfare, and (ii) the ban on education is strictly better than
any pooling equilibrium with e > 0 in terms of social welfare.
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In comparison with the separating equilibrium with eH , the zero education benets
workers with type L since uL
 
E [y] ; 0

> uL (yL; 0), while it benets workers with typeH
only if  2 (0; 1) is su¢ ciently large to satisfy uH
 
E [y] ; 0

> uH (yH ; eH). The concavity
assumption of uL ensures that the benet of type L is greater than the loss of type H
for small . In any pooling equilibrium with e 2 [0; e ()], it is socially optimal to ban
education since it clearly benets workers with both types.
We now return to our original model and consider any interior equilibrium in which
some fraction of workers are motivated to make the investment and become type H. The
ban on education (no signaling) leads to the boundary equilibrium in which every worker
has type L and the social welfare is
U0 = uL (yL; 0) : (29)
We next show that the social welfare is higher in any interior separating or pooling equi-
librium than in the boundary equilibrium. In an interior separating equilibrium, a worker
with c 2 (ks; c) has type L and obtains utility uL (yL; 0), while a worker with c 2 (c; ks)
has type H and obtains utility uH (yH ; eH)  c > uL (yL; 0), where the inequality is given
by ks = uH (yH ; eH)   uL (yL; 0) > c. In an interior pooling equilibrium, a worker with
c 2 (kp; c) has type L and obtains utility uL
 
E [y] ; e
  uL (yL; 0) for e 2 [0; e ()], while
a worker with c 2 (c; kp) has type H and obtains utility uH
 
E [y] ; e
   c > uL (yL; 0),
where the inequality is given by kp = uH(E [y] ; e)   uL(E [y] ; e) > c. The following
proposition reports this comparison.
Proposition 7 In any interior separating or pooling equilibrium, signaling is socially
benecial; the ban on education (no signaling) reduces social welfare from the level that
would obtain under any interior separating or pooling equilibrium.
This result shows that the signaling aspect of education is justiable from the perspec-
tive of welfare: this seemingly wasteful action becomes socially benecial when it induces
any human capital investment by delivering the benets of the investment. The result
also implies that the social value of signaling may be unduly underrated if its e¤ect on
the human capital investment is not taken into account.
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4.2 Welfare-maximizing signaling
In this subsection, we characterize the welfare-maximizing signaling in each interior equi-
librium.16 We say that an interior equilibrium is optimal when it uses the welfare-
maximizing signaling.
We assume that uH (0; eH)   uL (0; eH) > c. Then an interior separating equilibrium




[uH (yH ; eH)  c]dG(c) +
Z c
ks
uL (yL; 0) dG(c)




The second equality follows from ks = uH (yH ; eH)   uL (yL; 0). The social welfare Us
consists of two terms: the welfare for type L and the expected gain from the human
capital investment. By integrating by parts, we can rewrite Us as




Hence, in an interior separating equilibrium, it is socially benecial to maximize the human
capital investment (ks): an interior separating equilibrium maximizes the investment to
maximize the social welfare. Since it follows from Lemma 1 that a decrease in eH increases
the threshold ks by increasing the utility gain from becoming type H, an optimal interior
separating equilibrium selects the least costly signaling for type H that maximizes the
human capital investment (ks).
We assume thatD (e ())   for some  2 (0; 1). Then an interior pooling equilibrium




[uH(E [y] ; e)  c]dG(c) +
Z c
kp
uL(E [y] ; e)dG(c):
Using kp = uH(E [y] ; e)  uL(E [y] ; e) and integration by parts, we nd that the social
welfare Up consists of the welfare for type L and the expected gain from the human capital
16In the Appendix, we also examine how an optimal interior signaling is a¤ected when there exists
an environmental improvement that reduces the expected cost of the human capital investment: the
distribution function G shifts up to F in terms of rst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) such that F













The choice of e = D 1 () is made under the constraint f 2 (0; 1) : D (e ())  g. An
optimal pooling equilibrium is not straightforward to nd: to increase the workers incen-
tive to make the investment (kp), it is necessary to increase the signaling cost for type L.
Since uq is assumed to be di¤erentiable and the expected wage is E [y] = yL +G (kp)B,























Hence, in an interior pooling equilibrium, it is not necessarily socially benecial to maxi-
mize the human capital investment (kp) by increasing the costly signaling: an increase in e
improves the welfare by promoting the human capital investment, but it also worsens the
welfare directly by increasing the signaling cost of type L. The following lemma highlights
this point.
Lemma 3 For any interior pooling equilibrium with e and kp = uH (0; e)   uL (0; e), if
the density g(uH (0; e)   uL (0; e)) is su¢ ciently small, then an increase in e causes the
welfare loss.

















Thus, if g(kp) = g(uH (0; e)  uL (0; e)) is su¢ ciently small in (32), then an increase in e
causes the welfare loss, dUp=de < 0.
This result holds for any interior pooling equilibrium: for any interior pooling equi-
librium, an increase in the signaling e incurs the welfare loss whenever the corresponding
density g(kp) is su¢ ciently low at the margin where it is indi¤erent between making the
human capital investment and making no investment. The result shows that an interior
pooling equilibrium with e su¤ers from an oversignaling if an additional signaling e in-
creases a su¢ ciently small investment: an increase in e raises the workers incentive to
make the investment, uH (0; e)   uL (0; e), but it leads to only a small increase in hu-
man capital (increase in the fraction of type H) given the low density at the margin,
g(kp) = g(uH (0; e)  uL (0; e)).
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5 Comparison between separating and pooling
Thus far, we have separately analyzed two types of signaling by associating a separating
signaling with an interior separating equilibrium and associating a pooling signaling with
an interior pooling equilibrium. It might be interesting to compare two contrasting forms
of signaling. In this section, we identify circumstances under which two types of signaling
can be clearly ranked in terms of social welfare. We provide some insights into a proper
form of signaling: whether it is socially benecial to stay with a separating signaling
or switch to a pooling signaling is dependent on how each signaling induces the human
capital investment.
5.1 Signaling form and human capital investment
As our previous analysis shows, regardless of signaling types, any signaling is socially
benecial whenever it induces the human capital investment by delivering the benet
of the investment. In this subsection, we show that a separating signaling may be so-
cially inferior to a pooling signaling, without a larger inducement of the human capital
investment.
A di¢ culty of making this comparison is that the existence of two interior equilibria is
partially or entirely exclusive. We thus broaden the scope of parameters in which two inte-
rior equilibria coexist by considering a separating signaling for all eH 2 [eH ; eH ]. Allowing
for the signaling eH 2 (eH ; eH ] has the following consequences. First, an interior separat-
ing equilibrium with eH 2 (eH ; eH ] exists under the condition, uH (0; eH) uL (0; eH)  c,
where the interior separating equilibrium with eH cannot exist. Second, if any interior
pooling equilibrium exists, then an interior separating equilibrium always exists: if an
interior pooling equilibrium with e exists, then uH(0; e)   uL(0; e) > c is necessary, and
uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH) > c is also necessary, which conrms that an interior separating
equilibrium always exists since it still exists even when uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH)  c.
We begin by recalling that the intervals for eH 2 [eH ; eH ] and e 2 [0; e ()] are exclusive
and satisfy eH > e () for any  2 (0; 1). We show that a separating signaling, despite
its use of a higher signaling level eH , does not necessarily generate the human capital
investment more than a pooling signaling: as we show in the Appendix, we dene a
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function that is strictly decreasing in eH ,
 (eH ; e)  ks   kp = uH (yH ; eH)  uL (yL; 0)  [uH (0; e)  uL (0; e)];
and nd that there is a unique  (e) 2 (eH ; eH) such that  ( (e) ; e) = 0. Intuitively, if
eH 2 [eH ; eH ] increases above eH and gets closer to the upper bound eH , then the signaling
cost of eH becomes larger and thus workers become less encouraged to make the human
capital investment and become type H.
Proposition 8 Assume that there exists an interior pooling equilibrium with e. There
exists a unique  (e) 2 (eH ; eH) such that ks > kp for eH 2 [eH ;  (e)) and ks < kp for
eH 2 ( (e) ; eH ].
This result is perhaps surprising and has immediate welfare implications: (i) if kp > ks,
then Up > Us since




where uL(E [y] ; e)   uL (yL; 0)  0 (with equality only if e = e()) and (ii) if kp = ks,
then Up  Us (with equality only if e = e()). This comparison of social welfare based on
(33) leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Assume that there exists an interior pooling equilibrium with e. (i) If
kp > ks, then Up > Us, and if kp = ks, then Up  Us ( = only if e = e ()). (ii) If kp < ks,
then Up < Us for e = e (), but the relative magnitude of welfare depends on the models
specication for e < e ().
As we state in Proposition 7, the signaling aspect of education is socially benecial in
an interior equilibrium where the signaling induces the human capital investment. This
signaling aspect of education may be better represented by a separating signaling than by
a pooling signaling in that private information about individual types is conveyed by the
separating signaling. From the perspective of welfare, however, Proposition 9 shows that
a separating signaling may be inferior to a pooling signaling, without a larger inducement
of the human capital investment.
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5.2 Pooling signaling and moderation of investment
In this subsection, we specify the conditions under which an interior pooling equilibrium
is sure to exist and is strictly better than any separating equilibrium in terms of social
welfare.
We rst rank two types of signaling in terms of social welfare under the condition,
uH(0; e(1))  uL(0; e(1))  c, where there is no separating equilibrium with eH ; but there
is an interior separating equilibrium with eH > eH . This interior separating equilibrium
with eH > eH has the social welfare:




where ks = uH(yH ; eH)  uL(yL; 0) decreases when the separating signaling eH increases.
Thus, under the condition, an increase in eH reduces the human capital investment by
increasing the signaling cost of eH too much. An additional signaling eH is then socially
harmful.
Our rst nding is that a pooling signaling is strictly better than any separating
signaling under the condition:
uH(0; e(1))  uL(0; e(1)) > c; (34)
where e(1) = eH . This condition implies that there exists a unique  2 (0; 1) such that
uH(0; e())  uL(0; e()) = c (35)
and D (e ()) = 1 for all  2 [; 1]. Then there is an interior pooling equilibrium with e

























where U s is the upper bound of Us. Hence, under the condition (34), an interior pooling
equilibrium with signaling in moderation below eH can generate the welfare Up above U s.
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Our second nding is that a pooling signaling may be strictly better than any sepa-
rating signaling under the condition:
uH(0; e(1))  uL(0; e(1)) = c: (38)
This condition implies that D (e ()) = 1 only for  = 1, which corresponds to  = 1 in
(35). It is useful to know that the condition (34) and (38) have the di¤erence in terms of
the density g(kp()) for  = 1, where
kp()  uH(0; e ())  uL(0; e()):
(i) If  2 (0; 1), then g(kp(1)) = 0 given D(e ()) = G(kp()) = 1 for all  2 [; 1] and
(ii) if  = 1, then g(kp(1)) = g(c) given kp(1) = c.
Now, our second nding obtains in two steps. First, under (38), if the density at the
top g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then there exists an interior pooling equilibrium with the
limiting value e that satises e ! e (1), kp ! c and G(kp) ! 1. This interior pooling
equilibrium with the limiting value is sure to exist: under (38), given D (e (1)) = 1, if
g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then the slope lim!1 dD (e ()) =d in (23) is su¢ ciently small
since lim!1 g(kp()) = g(c). Second, as we show in Lemma 3, for any interior pooling
equilibrium with the limiting value e that satises e ! e (1), kp ! c and G(kp) ! 1,
if g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then an increase in e causes the welfare loss. This interior
pooling equilibrium with the limiting value e su¤ers from an oversignaling: a decrease in
e increases the social welfare. The interior pooling equilibrium with the limiting value
has its welfare Up that approaches U s,
Up ! uL (yH ; eH) +
Z c
c
G(c)dc = U s;
where the last equality follows from uL (yH ; eH) = uL (yL; 0), but this second step shows
that a decrease in e below the limiting value increases the welfare Up above U s. Hence,
under the condition (38), if g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then there exists a pooling equilibrium
that is strictly better than any separating equilibrium.
We next rank two types of signaling in terms of social welfare under the condition:
[uH(0; e(1))  uL(0; e(1))] 2 (c; c); (39)
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where there exists the separating equilibrium with eH . Our third nding is that, under
the condition (39), if g(c) is su¢ ciently small and uH(0; e(1))  uL(0; e(1)) is su¢ ciently
close to c, then a pooling signaling is strictly better than the separating signaling eH .
Since uH(0; e(1)) uL(0; e(1)) is su¢ ciently close to c, there exists the interior separating
equilibrium with eH such that ks ! c and its welfare Us ! U s. If there exists the
separating equilibrium with eH such that ks ! c and G(ks)! 1, then for g(c) su¢ ciently
small, there also exists an interior pooling equilibrium with the limiting value e such that
e! eH , kp ! c, G(kp)! 1 and its welfare
Up ! uL (yH ; eH) +
Z c
c
G(c)dc = U s;
since D (e (1)) ! 1 and lim!1 dD (e ()) =d in (23) is su¢ ciently small. For g(c) suf-
ciently small, a decrease in e below the limiting value increases the welfare Up above
U s.
We can summarize our ndings as follows: if uH(0; eH) uL(0; eH) > c, or if [uH(0; eH) 
uL(0; eH)] 2 (bc; c] for some bc su¢ ciently close to c and g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then there
exists an interior pooling equilibrium that is strictly better than any separating equilib-
rium in terms of social welfare. We now use Proposition 5 and associate the socially
preferred interior pooling equilibrium with the equilibrium that exists under the govern-
ments market design f0g [ [E;E].
Proposition 10 If uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH) > c, or if [uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH)] 2 (bc; c] for
some bc su¢ ciently close to c and g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then the market design (P)
maximizes the social welfare.
Proposition 10 consists of two parts: the uniqueness and advantage of an interior
pooling equilibrium. The result is based on the condition that ensures the existence of
an interior pooling equilibrium that approximates the full investment G(kp)! 1. We es-
tablish the result in two logical steps. First, we observe that the very best of all possible
interior separating equilibria, by motivating most of workers to become one type (typeH),
approaches an interior pooling equilibrium that approximates the full investment. Sec-
ond, we show that a pooling signaling is strictly better than a separating signaling under
two circumstances: (i) an additional separating signaling eH reduces human capital (the
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fraction of type H) by making the signaling cost for type H too high, so that any interior
separating equilibrium fails to approximate the full investment, and (ii) even when an inte-
rior separating equilibrium can approximate the full investment, it approaches an interior
pooling equilibrium that is too costly to implement and su¤ers from an overinvestment.
The following corollary presents the same result based on the productivity gap, B =
yH   yL.17
Corollary 3 Suppose that yH increases given yL. If B > B, or if B 2 ( bB;B] for some bB
su¢ ciently close to B and g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then the market design (P) maximizes
the social welfare.
It seems socially benecial to motivate more workers to undertake the human capital
investment; indeed, an interior separating equilibrium maximizes the investment to max-
imize the social welfare. Our nding shows, however, that it may be socially harmful to
stay with the separating signaling: before an interior separating equilibrium approaches
an interior pooling equilibrium that approximates the full investment and su¤ers from an
overinvestment, then it is socially benecial to switch from the separating signaling to a
pooling signaling and moderate the investment level. Specically, if uH(0; eH) uL(0; eH)
becomes su¢ ciently close to c and g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then an interior separating
equilibrium approaches an interior pooling equilibrium that approximates the full invest-
ment and su¤ers from an overinvestment.
For a concrete example, we consider the separating equilibrium with eH under the
circumstances where yH is su¢ ciently large given yL. The consequent enlargement of
B is socially benecial within the class of the interior separating equilibrium with eH .
18
As we show above, however, if B > B, or if B = B with g(c) su¢ ciently small, then a
pooling signaling is strictly better than any separating signaling. Further, even before
B reaches the critical point B, if B becomes closer to B and the density at the margin
17Recall that this comparative static analysis focuses on the case in which yH increases given yL;
uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH) is then a strictly increasing function of B. This focus is not necessary when uq is
a linear function of w.
18An increase in the wage gap B raises the signaling eH , which promotes the human capital investment
(ks) and the social welfare.
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g(uH(0; eH)  uL(0; eH)) becomes su¢ ciently small, then it is socially benecial to switch
from the separating signaling eH to a pooling signaling in moderation.
5.3 Separating signaling and promotion of investment
In this subsection, we show that a separating signaling may still be a socially preferred
option when a pooling signaling causes an underinvestment.
We rst report an immediate result that follows from Proposition 4 (iii): if [uH(0; eH) 
uL(0; eH)] 2 (c; c) is su¢ ciently close to c and g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then there exists
no interior pooling equilibrium, but there exists the interior separating equilibrium with
eH .
19 A pooling signaling then su¤ers from the welfare loss associated with undersignaling
by failing to induce any human capital investment: the unique pooling equilibrium is the
boundary equilibrium, and this boundary equilibrium is inferior to any interior equilibrium
in terms of social welfare.
To summarize our ndings, for [uH(0; eH) uL(0; eH)] 2 (c; c), if uH(0; eH) uL(0; eH)
is su¢ ciently close to c and g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then the unique pooling equilibrium
is the inferior boundary equilibrium, and if uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH) is su¢ ciently close to
c and g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then there exists an interior pooling equilibrium that is
strictly better than the interior separating equilibrium with eH . We nd it elusive to
compare two types of equilibria, other than in the parameter ranges presented above.
We conclude this subsection by showing that the separating signaling eH continues to
be socially preferred even when an interior pooling equilibrium exists, if this interior
pooling equilibrium generates a su¢ ciently small human capital investment. To obtain
this result, we make the following assumption for the rest of this subsection: [uH(0; eH) 
uL(0; eH)] 2 (c; c), and g(c) and g(c) are su¢ ciently small. Under the assumption, the
function D (e ()) is strictly increasing in  for all  2 [; 1] with the intercept D(e (1)) =
D(eH) 2 (0; 1), while the slopes of D (e ()) when  !  and  ! 1 remain su¢ ciently
at.
We next consider an interior pooling equilibrium that exists when the functionD(e())
has a tangent to the 45 degree line and thus D(e(0)) = 0 for some 0 2 (0; 1). For the
existence of this interior pooling equilibrium, suppose that yH increases given yL. From
19The conditions imply that D (e ()) <  for all  2 (0; 1) and D (e (1)) 2 (0; 1) hold.
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the denitions of eH and e (), it follows that eH increases and e () increases for all  > 0.
Since the function D (e ()) monotonically shifts up all    together with the intercept
D(e (1)) = D(eH), we can select the function D(e()) that satises D(e(
0)) = 0 for
some 0. This interior pooling equilibrium has the social welfare:





where 0 = G(k0p). Note that this equilibrium, given D(e(
0)) = 0, uses the signaling
e(0) since any e < e(0) implies D(e) < D(e(b)). Further, from the denition of e(0),
we nd
uL(yL + 
0B; e(0)) = uL(yL; 0):
We now compare U 0p to Us.
20 Since there exists the interior separating equilibrium with
eH under the assumption and since e(
0) < e(1) = eH , we have k
0
p < ks and




Thus, this pooling equilibrium, while generating some human capital investment, is in-
ferior to the separating equilibrium with eH . We emphasize that an interior pooling
equilibrium remains inferior, unless the function D(e()) is su¢ ciently high above the 45
degree line.21
In summary, under the assumption, if uH(0; eH) uL(0; eH) is su¢ ciently close to c and
g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then we have two possibilities: (i) the unique pooling equilibrium
induces no investment and has the welfare U0 or (ii) an interior pooling equilibrium exists,
but it is inferior to the interior separating equilibrium with eH . For an interior pooling
equilibrium to remain inferior, uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH) must be su¢ ciently below c given
g(c) su¢ ciently small; if uH(0; eH) uL(0; eH) is su¢ ciently close to c for g(c) su¢ ciently
small, then we have the result in Proposition 10.
20If 0 is not unique, we select the largest 0; the rst term in U 0p is the same, uL(yL + 
0B; e(0)) =
uL(yL; 0) for all 
0, but the second term is larger when 0 = G(k0p) is larger.
21An interior pooling equilibrium becomes superior to any separating equilibrium if the functionD(e())
is su¢ ciently high above the 45 degree line for su¢ ciently large . If D(e()) >  only for  su¢ ciently
small, then e() and kp are close to zero; an interior pooling equilibrum has the welfare close to U0.
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We now use Proposition 5 and associate the socially preferred interior separating
equilibrium with the equilibrium that exists under the governments market design.
Proposition 11 Assume that [uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH)] 2 (c; c), and g(c) and g(c) are
su¢ ciently small. There exists bc 2 (c; c) such that, if [uH(0; eH) uL(0; eH)] 2 (c;bc), then
the market design (S) maximizes the social welfare.
This result shows that, if the separating signaling eH still generates a su¢ ciently small
incentive to make the investment, then it is socially benecial to stay with the separating
signaling and focus on promoting the human capital investment: a pooling signaling may
then su¤er from an underinvestment by failing to provide any incentive to make the human
capital investment or by inducing too little incentive.
We illustrate our nding based on the productivity gap B under the same assumption
as above. Suppose that yH increases given yL. An increase in B then raises e () for all
 > 0, and the function D (e ()) monotonically shifts up all    together with the
intercept D(e (1)) = D(eH).
22 There is a critical value bB such that D(e(b)) = b for someb: if B > bB, then D (e ()) >  for some  2 (0; 1), and if B < bB, then D (e ()) <  for
all  2 (0; 1).
Corollary 4 Assume that [uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH)] 2 (c; c), and g(c) and g(c) are su¢ -
ciently small. If yH increases given yL, then there exists a unique bB 2 (B;B) such that,
for B 2 (B; bB), there exists no interior pooling equilibrium, and for B 2 [ bB;B), there
exists an interior pooling equilibrium.
We build on this lemma and compare two interior equilibria in terms of welfare under
the same assumption. For all B 2 (B;B), the interior separating equilibrium with eH
exists and has the social welfare Us in (30) with ks = uH (0; eH)  uL (0; eH). The welfare
22The value e () is sensitive to the way B increases. For example, (i) yH increases given yL, and (ii)
yL decreases given yH . For (i), we know from uL(yL+B; e ()) = uL(yL; 0) that e () for  2 (0; 1) and
e (1) = eH increases. For (ii), we nd that e () decreases for  2 (0; 1) and e (1) = eH remains constant.
Again, we can greatly simplify our comparative static analysis by focusing on (i), not mixing (i) and (ii),
since when B increases, the function D (e ()) monotonically shifts up for all   . Notice also that this
monotonic property directly holds, regardless of the way B changes, if uq is a linear function with w.
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with the boundary condition: if B ! B, then ks ! c and Us ! U0. For B 2 (B; bB),
the unique pooling equilibrium is the boundary equilibrium with the welfare U0. For
B 2 [ bB;B), an interior pooling equilibrium exists with the welfare Up in (31). We focus
on the optimal interior pooling equilibrium with eo and kop which generates the welfare
U op . We use the envelope theorem and nd that U
o







with the boundary condition: if B = bB, then U op = bUp < Us. Hence, if B 2 (B; bB), then
U op = U0 < Us, and if B = bB, then U op = bUp < Us. Since U op is strictly increasing in B
for B 2 [ bB;B) and U op > Us for B su¢ ciently close to B, there exists bB0 2 ( bB;B) such
that, for B 2 (B; bB0), the separating signaling with eH is strictly better than any pooling
signaling in terms of social welfare.
Corollary 5 Assume that [uH(0; eH)   uL(0; eH)] 2 (c; c), and g(c) and g(c) are su¢ -
ciently small. If yH increases given yL, then there exists bB0 2 ( bB;B) such that, for all
B 2 (B; bB0), then the market design (S) maximizes the social welfare.
Together with Corollary 4, this result demonstrates the circumstance under which
the separating signaling eH continues to be socially preferred when a pooling signaling
generates an insu¢ cient incentive to make the human capital investment.
5.4 Numerical examples
For a numerical work, we use the previous utility function, uq (w; e) = w   cq (e), where
cL (e) = e
2 and cH (e) = ae2. In the previous example where G is a uniform distribu-
tion function on [0; 1], we showed that the separating equilibrium with eH and an interior
pooling equilibrium exists only in entirely separate parameter ranges. To present the exis-
tence of both types of interior equilibria, we here consider a truncated normal distribution









where f(x) is the density function of a normal random variable with mean and variance,










), where  1 < x < 1. The separating signaling
remains the same as above and satises
eH =
p
B and ks = (1  a)B:
To ensure the existence of this separating equilibrium with eH , we restrict attention to
(1   a)B < 1. A pooling signaling e has the threshold kp = (1   a)e2. For an interior
equilibrium, e must be curtailed to satisfy (1  a)e2 < 1. Since e () = pB, we have
kp() = (1  a)(e ())2 = (1  a)B:
Using the distribution function G in (41), we can now derive the function:





We have numerically conrmed that an interior pooling equilibrium exists in a wide
range of (; ). In particular, an increase in (1  a)B = ks expands the parameter range
in which an interior pooling equilibrium exists: if the fraction of type H increases in the
separating equilibrium with eH , then an interior pooling equilibrium becomes more likely
to exist. If (1   a)B increases, then kp() increases for all  > 0, which means that the
function G((1  a)B) shifts up for all  > 0. In extreme, if (1  a)B approaches 1, then
the condition G((1   a)B)   holds for  su¢ ciently large in a wide range of (; ).
For this case of (1   a)B ! 1, if  = 0:5, then G((1   a)B)   continues to hold
approximately for  2 (0:5; 1) even when  changes in a relevant range: given  = 0:5,
if  decreases, then G((1   a)B) shifts up (down) for higher (lower)  with the same
values of G(0) and G(1).23 On the other hand, if (1 a)B decreases, then kp() decreases
for all  > 0, which means that D(e ()) shifts down for all  > 0; thus, a decrease in
(1  a)B diminishes the parameter range in which an interior pooling equilibrium exists.
For example, if (1  a)B decreases to 0:5 given  = 0:5 as above, then G((1  a)B)  
fails for all  2 (0; 1). When (1   a)B decreases, however, if  becomes small, then
the condition G((1   a)B)   may still hold for some  2 (0; 1). This decrease in 
represents that there is an environmental improvement that reduces the expected cost of
23If  becomes su¢ ciently large, then G(x) approximates the uniform distribution.
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the human capital investment. For this case of (1 a)B = 0:5, an increase in  reduces the
potential parameter range in which an interior pooling equilibrium exists: given  = 0:25,
if  = 0:1, then G((1  a)B)   holds approximately for  2 (0:5; 1), if  = 0:15, then
the condition holds approximately for  2 (0:57; 0:91) and if  = 0:25, then the condition
fails for all  2 (0; 1). In summary, if (1   a)B increases, or if  becomes smaller, then
the distribution function G((1 a)B) tends to shift in favor of expanding the parameter
range in which an interior pooling equilibrium exists.
In the Appendix, Table 1 selects a few results from extensive numerical examples.
The comparison of two types of interior equilibria is based on the restriction, (1  a)B <
1, which ensures the existence of the separating equilibrium with eH . Recall that this
restriction is not necessary for the existence of an interior pooling equilibrium; if (1 a)B >
1, or if (1   a)B = 1 and g(c) is su¢ ciently small, then an interior pooling equilibrium
is sure to exist and is strictly better than any separating signaling. The table reports 6
di¤erent sets of parameters in which two types of equilibrium exist at the same time. The
pooling signaling e, reported in the table, is optimal: it is selected from the set of interior
pooling equilibria and it maximizes Up in (31). The rst 5 columns report the parameter
sets in which the pooling signaling is strictly better than the separating signaling with
eH , whereas the last column reports the parameter set in which the separating is strictly
better.24
We can summarize the features found in the numerical work. First, if (1   a)B = ks
is small, then the separating signaling tends to dominate a pooling signaling in terms
of social welfare: if (1   a)B = ks is small, then a pooling signaling often leads to
undersignaling by failing to induce any human capital investment, or by inducing only an
insu¢ cient level of investment. Second, if (1   a)B = ks becomes larger and an interior
pooling equilibrium begins to exist, then the dominance of one type of signaling over the
other becomes unclear, and if (1   a)B = ks gets su¢ ciently large, then oversignaling
of a separating signaling becomes evident and a pooling signaling tends to dominate the
separating signaling in terms of social welfare.
24The table shows that the proportions of type H, G(ks) and G(kp), are quite high. This outcome,
however, depends on the model specication: if the cost of education becomes greater in the utility
function, the proportions may be reduced.
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6 Conclusions
The relationship between signaling and human capital investment has rarely received
attention from the analytical literature. In this paper, we modify the Spences (1973)
classic signaling model with mild assumptions and develop a signaling model that has a
causal relationship between the two. We then ask some essential questions. First, we ask
whether signaling is socially benecial or wasteful, and nd that the social value of signal-
ing may be signicantly underrated if its inducement of the human capital investment is
not taken into account: this seemingly wasteful action becomes socially benecial when-
ever it induces the human capital investment by delivering the benets of the investment.
Second, we ask whether it is socially benecial or harmful to promote the human capital
investment, and nd that the human capital investment may be overly emphasized if the
cost of signaling that induces the investment is not taken into account: it may be socially
harmful to maximize the human capital investment by increasing the costly signaling.
Third, we ask whether it is socially benecial or harmful to convey private information
about individual types in the form of a separating signaling, as opposed to a pooling
signaling, we nd that the choice of a proper form of signaling may be dependent on how
each signaling promotes the human capital investment.
7 Appendix I
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Since E satises (13), E 2 [eH ; eH ]. We show that any
e > E does not satisfy the intuitive criterion. Suppose a separating equilibrium in which
type H chooses eH > E. It is su¢ cient to demonstrate that type H can attain a higher
payo¤by deviating from the separating equilibrium, and type L cannot imitate the action
of type H. In other words, we show that given any e0 2 (E; eH),
uH (yH ; e
0) > uH (yH ; eH) and uL (yL; 0) > uL (yH ; e0) .
The former inequality follows from e0 < eH , and the latter is from uL (yL; 0) = uH (yH ; eH) >
uL (yH ; e
0) for e0 > E  eH .
(ii) Suppose that there is an interior pooling equilibrium satisfying the intuitive crite-
rion. Then, the wage that each type can obtain is w  yH + (1  ) yL. It is su¢ cient
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to demonstrate that a worker with type H can attain a higher payo¤ by deviating from
a pooling equilibrium e < E, and a worker with type L cannot imitate the action of the
worker with type H. In other words, we show that given any e < E, there exists e0  E
such that
uH (yH ; e
0) > uH (w; e) and uL (w; e) > uL (yH ; e0) (42)
Since yH > w, there exists e00 > e such that uL(w; e) = uL(yH ; e00). It follows from SMP
that
uH(yH ; e
00)  uH(yH ; e) > uL(yH ; e00)  uL(yH ; e),
which can be rewritten as
uH(yH ; e
00)  uL(yH ; e00) > uH(yH ; e)  uL(yH ; e) = uH(w; e)  uL(w; e),
where the last equality follows from (2). By uL(w; e) = uL(yH ; e00),
uH(yH ; e
00)  uH(w; e) > uL(yH ; e00)  uL(w; e) = 0.
Since e is continuous, there exists e0 > e00 such that e0 satises (42). Furthermore, if uLs
marginal cost is su¢ ciently high, e0 is close to e such that e0  E.
Proof of Proposition 6. For a separating equilibrium, since uH (yH ; 0) > uH (yH ; eH),
we have
uH (yH ; 0) + (1  )uL (yL; 0) > UBs :
Thus, to verify the result UB0 > U
B
s , it su¢ ces to show that
uH
 




E [y] ; 0
  [uH (yH ; 0) + (1  )uL (yL; 0)]  0:
The LHS of this inequality becomes
[uH
 
E [y] ; 0
  uH (yH ; 0)] + (1  )[uL  E [y] ; 0  uL (yL; 0)]
= [uL
 
E [y] ; 0
  uL (yH ; 0)] + (1  )[uL  E [y] ; 0  uL (yL; 0)]
= uL
 
E [y] ; 0
  [uL (yH ; 0) + (1  )uL (yL; 0)]  0:
The rst equality follows from the assumption that the utility gain from any wage increase
is type-irrelevant, and the last inequality is given by concavity of uL in w. For a pooling




Proof of Proposition 8. Since uL (yH ; eH) = uL
 
E [y] ; e ()

, so we have e () <
eH such as in the standard case. Dene
 (eH ; e)  ks   kp = uH (yH ; eH)  uL (yL; 0)  (uH (0; e)  uL (0; e)) .
Given any e 2 (0; e ()], by the assumption (2) and the denitions of eH and eH in (5),
 (eH ; e) = uH (yH ; eH)  uL (yL; 0)  (uH (0; e)  uL (0; e))
= uH (yH ; eH)  uL (yH ; eH)  (uH (0; e)  uL (0; e))
= uH (0; eH)  uL (0; eH)  (uH (0; e)  uL (0; e))
= uH (0; eH)  uH (0; e)  (uL (0; eH)  uL (0; e)) > 0 from SMP,
and
 (eH ; e) = uH (yH ; eH)  uL (yL; 0)  (uH (0; e)  uL (0; e))
= uH (yL; 0)  uL (yL; 0)  (uH (0; e)  uL (0; e))
=   (uH (0; e)  uL (0; e)) < 0.
In addition,  (eH ; e) is a strictly decreasing function of eH . Hence, given each e, there
exists a unique implicit function  (e) 2 (eH ; eH) such that  ( (e) ; e) = 0. Hence, for
eH 2 [eH ;  (e))],  (eH ; e) > 0, so ks > kp. For eH 2 [ (e) ; eH ],  (eH ; e) < 0, so ks < kp.
Environmental Improvement in Investment. We examine the e¤ect of an envi-
ronmental improvement that reduces the expected cost of the human capital investment:
the distribution function G shifts up to F in terms of rst-order stochastic dominance






cdG(c). In an interior sep-
arating equilibrium with eH 2 [eH ; eH ], this shift from G to F has no e¤ect on the least
costly signaling eH and ks = uH(yH ; eH)  uL(yL; 0); thus, the social welfare Us increases
directly from the direct cost reduction.
In an interior pooling equilibrium, since E [y] = yL +G(kp)B increases for each e and
the choice set of e 2 [0; e ()] expands, the social welfare Up unambiguously increases.
The e¤ect on the signaling e is less clear. We consider the derivative dUp
de
in (32) and make
the following assumptions: (i) uL(w; e) takes a separable form,
uL (w; e) = v(w)  cL (e) for any linear function v(); (43)
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and Up in (31) is strictly concave (at least locally) at the welfare-maximizing signaling
e, and (ii) G shifts up to F in terms of the likelihood ratio (LR): density functions,




f(bc) for all c < bc, (44)




the assumptions, by selecting e and k = uH (0; e)   uL (0; e), we can nd that, if the
existing signaling is su¢ ciently small such that e  e and kp  k, then the marginal
welfare benet dUp
de
clearly increases for each e since both g(kp) and G(kp) shift up in (32).
The shift from G to F then generates robust force in favor of increasing the signaling and
the fraction of type H. On the other hand, if the existing signaling is su¢ ciently large
such that e > e and kp > k, then it becomes di¢ cult to determine whether the marginal
welfare benet dUp
de
increases or decreases, since g(kp) falls while G(kp) rises. For example,









B  f(c) + @uH
@e
:
If g(c) and f(c) are su¢ ciently close to zero, or if g(c)  f(c), then the signaling e cannot
increase. In summary, if G shifts up to F in terms of LR, and uL satises (43), then the
pooling signaling e increases for su¢ ciently small e.
25Note that the LR dominance of G over F is more restrictive than the FOSD of G over F : g(c)f(c)  g(bc)f(bc)
for all c < bc implies G(c)  F (c) for all c.
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8 Appendix II: Table 1
(; ) (0:5; 0:25) (0:5; 0:15) (0:5; 0:1) (0:5; 0:1) (0:25; 0:1) (0:25; 0:15)
(a;B) (0:6; 2:4) (0:7; 3) (0:5; 1:5) (0:6; 2) (0:5; 1:2) (0:5; 1)
eH =
p
B 1:54919 1:73205 1:22474 1:41421 1:09545 1:00000
ks = (1  a)B 0:96000 0:90000 0:75000 0:80000 0:60000 0:50000
G(ks) 0:98938 0:99660 0:99379 0:99865 0:99977 0:94981
e 1:45175 1:56297 1:17267 1:30534 0:92205 0:95374
kp 0:84303 0:73286 0:68757 0:68157 0:42509 0:45481
G(kp) 0:93477 0:94010 0:96966 0:96530 0:95977 0:90961
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